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Abstract
In the last few years, a significant number of mobile payment systems have been proposed. Most of them have been
based on a scenario where all the entities are directly connected to each other (formally called Full connectivity scenario).
Although these scenarios oﬀer advantages to protocol designers in terms of design simplicity and the development of
payment protocols without losing security capabilities, the full connectivity scenario does not consider those situations
where the client cannot directly communicate with the merchant. We present the design of an anonymous secure Pay-
ment protocol based on the Payment Gateway Centric scenario for those scenarios in mobile environments where the
Client cannot communicate directly with the Merchant to process the Payment Request. Our proposed protocol uses
symmetric-key operations which require low computational power and can be processed faster than asymmetric ones.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer]
Keywords: Cryptography; Payment; Performance; Protocol; Electronic Commerce
1. Introduction
Since the first credit-card appeared in the 50’s, the so called ’plastic money’ has been widely accepted
as a payment method. The exponential growth of the Internet has helped the development, proliferation and
adoption of various types of electronic commerce systems which allow online payments.
A significant number of mobile payment systems have emerged in the last few years which allow pay-
ments for services and goods from mobile devices using diﬀerent kinds of payments: credit-card payments,
micropayments and digital coins. The relationship between the client and the merchant is quite strict for
most of these mobile payment systems and does not allow the use of schemes in which direct communication
among these parties is not possible. Hence, it becomes necessary to develop mobile payment systems where
the client interacts with the merchant by sending messages through the payment gateway (an intermediate
entity for payment clearing purposes which cannot decrypt the messages sent by the client).
Symmetric and asymmetric signature methods have been widely used to provide authentication in elec-
tronic Payment systems (including Mobile Commerce (M-commerce)) [1]. However, traditional asymmetric
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signature schemes make the signature computations very expensive and not suitable for those portable de-
vices available on the market and are not based on the Texas Instruments TMS320C55x processor family
(which delivers high performance, peripheral options, small packaging, and low power dissipation for the
implementation of asymmetric operations in a eﬃcient way) [2, 3]. Therefore, traditional asymmetric au-
thentication schemes are not suitable for scenarios where an engaging party has connectivity restrictions, and
consequently, communication with other parties (such a Certification Authority for verifying a certificate) is
not possible during such payment transactions.
The mobile payment protocol proposed in this work eliminates the restriction of those mobile payment
systems based on the Full Connectivity Scenario which requires direct communication between a client and
a merchant for authentication purposes. Our proposed payment protocol supports both credit-card and debit-
card transactions, protects the real identity of the client during the purchase and employs a symmetric-based
signature scheme to satisfy the security requirements of the protocol proposed in this work. Symmetric
cryptography (which employs a shared key between two parties) provides message confidentiality, message
integrity, provides the authentication of participants and supports an alternative method to secure protocols
for mobile payment systems. Moreover, symmetric-key operations do not require high computational power
nor do they require additional communication processing steps.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related works and the contributions
of this work. In section 3, we describe the notations used in our proposed scheme, the operational model
and the proposed protocol. We analyze the security and performance of the proposed protocol in Section 4.
Finally, we make some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Related Works and Our Contributions
In the last decade, several mobile payment protocols, based on the Full Connectivity scenario (where all
the entities are directly connected to each other [4]), have been proposed to improve the security of these
kind of payment systems [5, 6]. Most of these proposals have considered the following methods to provide
authentication: username/password, symmetric, asymmetric and elliptic curve cryptography, smart card, 2d
bar code, and biometric methods [7, 8, 9] but some of them do not oﬀer adequate security for M-commerce
applications although symmetric and asymmetric signatures have been widely used for authentication pur-
poses. Unfortunately, usage of these protocols within the Payment Gateway Centric Case mobile scenario
is not possible because it restricts the communication which allows only interaction between the client and
the payment gateway and between the merchant and the payment gateway. However, some protocols could
be reformulated to overcome this restriction, achieving the same security and performance but for scenarios
with communication restriction.
Contributions: In this work, we consider the problem of eliminating the restriction of those mobile
payment systems that require direct communication between the client and the merchant for authentication
purposes by providing anonymity of the origin of the data to prevent the merchant from associating the
client with the messages that originated from him/her.
Inspired by the Payment Gateway Centric Model proposed by [4] and in contrast to previous proposals
published for restricted scenarios [10, 11, 12, 13], we present a secure Payment Centric Model using Sym-
metric cryptography (PCMS) protocol for those situations where the Client cannot communicate directly
with the Merchant to process the Payment Request.
3. Our Approach
3.1. Operational Model
The PCMS protocol was designed by taking into consideration the model suggested by Abad-Peiro et al.
[14] such that the proposed protocol can be used by diﬀerent payment methods. Thus, our proposed payment
protocol uses the following entities: client, merchant, issuer (client’s financial institution), and acquirer
(merchant’s financial institution). An additional entity called the payment gateway acts as a intermediary
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between acquirer/issuer (bank’s private network side) and the client/vendor (the Internet side) for clearing
purposes [15].
The five entities in PCMS and their interactions are shown in Figure 1. It is worth noting that is no direct
interaction between the Client and the Merchant and consequently, messages between both entities should
be sent through the payment gateway (which cannot decrypt this message).
The connection between the Client and the Payment Gateway and between the Merchant and the Pay-
ment Gateway is set up through the Internet, using communication technologies (wired, wireless, cellular)
oﬀered by a mobile phone operator (such as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Enhanced Data rates
for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) of Evolution (EDGE), Evolution-Data Optimized
(EvDO), etc.). Since the Issuer, the Acquirer, and the Payment Gateway all operate over the private networks
of banks, the secure exchange of messages among them is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, before receiving Payment services, the Merchant must register with the Payment Gateway to
receive the secret S ecM−PG from the PG. The Client must also register with an Issuer. During the Client’s
registration, the following steps are performed:
1. The Client shares his/her credit- and/or debit-card information (CDCI) with the Issuer (who will not
reveal it to any Merchant). The registration can be done either in person at the issuer’s premises or
via the issuers website.
2. The Issuer assigns several nicknames to the Client because of the trust relationship between both
of them. These nicknames are known only to the Client and the Issuer and are used to prevent the
Merchant from knowing the identity of the Client[1].
3. The Client registers herself/himself to the Payment Gateway. Then, the Payment Gateway shares the
secret S ecC−PG with the client. Besides, the issuer shares the secret S ecC−I with the client.
Fig. 1. Proposed Payment protocol based on the Payment Gateway Centric scenario (PCMS) Operational Model.
3.2. Notations
All the entities involved in our protocol are called parties and communicate through either wireless or
wired networks or a combination of both. The symbols C, M, PG, I, and A are used to denote the names of
the parties Client, Merchant, Payment Gateway, Issuer and Acquirer, respectively. The following symbols
are used to represent messages used in our proposed protocol:
- IDP; The identity of party P that contains the contact information of P.
- NIDC: Client’s nickname, temporary identity.
- TID: Identity of transaction that includes time and date of the transaction.
- TSTP: Timestamp generated by P.
- Stt: The status of transaction (Stt = {Accepted, Rejected}).
- OD: Order description.
- Price: Amount and currency.
- OI: Order information (OI = {TID, OD, h(OD,Price)}).
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- TC: The type of card used in the purchase process (TC={Credit, Debit}).
- TIDReq: The request for TID.
- MIDReq: The request for Merchant Identity (IDM).
- SECA−B: The master secret shared between parties A and B.
- {M}x: The message M symmetrically encrypted with the shared key x.
- h(M): The one-way hash function of the message M.
- MAC(X,K): Message Authentication Code of the message X with the key K.
- KS A−Bt : The session key shared between parties A and B, generated applying a hash func-
tion with t-bit cyclic shifting (either left shift or right shift) of KS A−B. More
details can be found in [12].
- ”PRequest”: Payment Request.
- ”PResponse”: Payment Response.
- ”VSRequest”: Value-Substraction Request.
- ”VSResponse”: Value-Substraction Response.
- ”VCRequest”: Value-Claim Request.
- ”VCResponse”: Value-Claim Response.
3.3. Our proposed Payment Gateway Centric Model Payment Protocol (PCMS)
The PCMS Protocol is composed by two sub-protocols: the PCMS Merchant Registration Protocol
(called MRP and it is executed between the Client C and the Merchant M) and the PCMS Payment Protocol
(called PP and is executed among the Client C, the Merchant M and the Payment Gateway PG).
The Client has to register with the Merchant in the PCMS Merchant Registration Protocol in order
to send the master key KS C−M . The protocol has to be executed every time the Client wants to perform
transactions with a Merchant. The details of the protocol are as follows:
The Client C generates the master key KS C−M and sends it with her/his nickname NIDC , a nonce
n for the challenge-response and MIDReq to PG, encrypted with the session key w. Once the Payment
Gateway PG receives the message, decrypts it and forwards the received message to M, encrypted with
the session key y. After the Merchant M receives the message, she/he sends the Merchant’s identity (IDM)
and h(n, NIDC , IDM , KS C−M), encrypted with the session key y. The Payment Gateway PG decrypts the
message sent by M and encrypts it with the session key w before sending it to the Client C.
Once C and M have exchanged the necessary information, they can generate a new set of KS C−Mi using
the same key generation technique. The Client may then start the PCMS Payment Protocol.
For the PCMS Payment Protocol, the Client purchases goods from the Merchant and pays for them using
her/his credit-card or debit-card. This protocol is formalized as follows:
1) C→ PG→M: NIDC , i, T IDReq
M→ PG→ C: {T ID, IDM}KS C−Mi
Step 1: The Client C and Merchant M exchange (through the Payment Gateway PG) the information
necessary to start the protocol by performing the following sub-steps.
1-1: C sends his/her nickname (NIDC), the index i (that will be used to generate the session key bet-
ween the Client and the Merchant) and the request for the transaction identity (TIDReq) to PG.
1-2: The Payment Gateway forwards the message received from C to M.
1-3: M receives the request and sends back its identity (IDM) and T ID to PG, encrypted with KS C−Mi .
1-4: The Payment Gateway forwards the message received from M to C.
2) C→ PG: PRequest
PRequest = {OI, Price, NIDC , IDI , TS TC , z, h(KS C−Iz ), VS Request}KS C−Mi ,
MAC[(OI, Price, NIDC , IDI , TS TC , z, h(KS C−Iz ), KS C−Mi+1 ]
VS Request = (MAC[(Price, h(OI), TS TC , TC, IDM), KS C−Iz ], TC, TS TC)
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Step 2: Client C creates a Payment Request (referred to in the General Payment Model [14]) using the
following sub-steps.
2-1: A Value-Subtraction Request (called VSRequest) is created and it includes
MAC[(Price, h(OI), TS TC , TC, IDM), KS C−Iz ], TS TC and TC.
2-2: A new message is created which includes C′s nickname, I′s identity, Price, OI (used to inform
M about the goods and prices requested), VSRequest, the index z, the timestamp TS TC read from
C′s clock, h(KS C−Iz ) (used to prevent the approval of the payment from being modified in step
4-5) and MAC[(OI, Price, NIDC , IDI , TS TC , z, h(KS C−Iz ), KS C−Mi+1 ].
2-3: The message created in the previous sub-step (henceforth referred to as the Payment Request) is
encrypted with the session key KS C−Mi .
2-4: The Payment Request is sent to the Payment Gateway.
3) PG→M: PRequest
Step 3: The Payment Gateway PG receives the Payment Request (sent from C) and forwards it to the
Merchant M for its processing.
4) M→ PG: {VCRequest, IDM , z, h(KS C−Iz )}KS M−PGk , k,
MAC[(VCRequest, IDM , z, h(KS C−Iz ), KS M−PGk+1 ]
VCRequest = (VS Request, TS TM , h(OI), T ID, Price, NIDC , IDI)
Step 4: The Merchant M generates the Value-Claim Request (called VCRequest) by performing the follo-
wing sub-steps.
4-1: The message received from PG is decrypted to extract OI, TS TC and VS Request.
4-2: The timeliness of the Payment Request is verified. If the check is successful, the following sub-
steps are performed.
4-3: The VCRequest is prepared and contains VCRequest, TS TM , h(OI), the identity of the transaction,
order’s amount, C’s nickname and I’s identity.
4-4: The VCRequest, the M’s identity, h(KS C−Iz ) and the index z, are encrypted with KS M−PGK .
4-5: The encrypted message in sub-step 4-4 is then transmitted to the Payment Gateway PG with k
and MAC[(VCRequest, IDM , z, h(KS C−Iz ), KS M−PGk+1 ].
5) Using the bank’s private network,
5.1) PG→ I: NIDC , IDM , VS Request, T ID, h(OI), z, Price, h(KS C−Iz )
5.2) PG→ A: Price, IDM
4.3) I,A→ PG: VS Response, S tt, h(S tt, h(OI), h(KS C−Iz ))
VS Response = {S tt, h(OI), h(KS M−PGk+1 )}KS C−Iz
Step 5: Using the private network of the bank, the Payment Gateway (PG) performs the following sub-
steps to verify and approve the Payment.
5-1: The VCRequest is decrypted to retrieve VSRequest and the other fields, such as IDM , NIDC .
5-2: The timeliness of VCRequest is verified. If the check is successful, the following steps are exe-
cuted.
5-3: The VSRequest and other important parameters such as: h(OI), T ID, IDM , Price, z and h(KS C−Iz)
are forwarded to the Issuer (I) where it is decided whether to approve or reject the transaction.
5-4: IDM and the requested price Price are sent to confirm to the Acquirer A that the Merchant is the
party to whom the requested amount Price will be transferred to.
5-5: The approved result (Stt) and the Value-subtraction Response (called VSResponse and encrypted
with KS C−Iz ) are received from the Issuer I. It is worthwhile noting that the VSResponse is pre-
pared by the Issuer after (a) checking the timeliness of the VSRequest and the validity of the
Client’s account, and (b) after transferring the total amount of OI to the Merchant’s account.
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6) PG→M: VCResponse
VCResponse = {S tt, h(S tt, h(OI), h(KS C−Iz ))}KS M−PGk+1
Step 6: The Payment Gateway PG generates the Value-Claim Response (called VCResponse) in the follo-
wing sub-steps.
6-1: The VCResponse is created and includes S tt and h(S tt, h(OI), h(KC−Iz )).
6-2: The VCResponse is encrypted with KS M−PGk+1 and is sent to M.
7) PG→ C: PResponse
PResponse = {VS Response}KS C−PP j+1
Step 7: The Payment Gateway PG generates the Payment Response (which represents the result of the
client’s request and is called PResponse) in the following sub-steps.
7-1: The PResponse is created and includes the VSResponse.
7-2: The PResponse is encrypted with KS C−PG j+1 and is sent to C.
7-3: Once the client recieves the message, it decrypts it to retrieve VSResponse. Then, the Client’s
own OI is compared with the received h(OI) to check whether or not the message is the response
of his request . If they do not match, a message is sent to the Payment Gateway to notify it of the
response failure. The Payment Gateway then starts a recovery procedure or resends the message.
After a transaction is completed, KS C−Mi , KS C−Iz , KS M−PGk y KS C−PG j are put in the revocations list
of every entity of the system to prevent their replay between the Client and the Merchant. Fig. 2 shows the
transmitted messages among the parties of the system during the execution of our proposed PCMS Payment
Protocol.
Fig. 2. Message exchange during the execution of the PCMS Payment Protocol.
4. Proposed Payment Protocol Analysis and Discussions
4.1. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed Payment Protocol. In the case of PCMS protocol,
the client uses a nickname NIDC (a temporary identity known only to the client and the issuer) instead of
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his/her real identity. As a result neither the merchant nor the payment gateway can map the nickname to the
client’s true identity. This anonymity protects relevant information from third parties but not unrestrained
anonymity (because if it is necessary, the anonymity of a transaction can be undone at a later time) [16].
The Confidentiality of messages transmitted in each transaction while in transit with the proposed pro-
tocol is protected by employing symmetric cryptography. Moreover, the encryption key also allows the
receiver and the sender to authenticate each other. In addition, to maintain the Integrity of important mes-
sages, the proposed protocol uses the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
Since the session key KS C−IZ could be generated only by the Client or Issuer but not by the Merchant,
the Non-repudiation of a transaction is ensured in the proposed protocol PCMS. Thus, the Merchant can
provide a non-repudiable evidence to prove to other parties that the Client has sent a message or requested
the Merchant to perform a transaction.
The Timestamp included in the transmitted message ensures the freshness of the message and prevents
replay attacks. Moreover, the usage of diﬀerent session keys from one master secret for every transaction
makes the proposed protocol secure against key guessing attacks.
4.2. Performance Analysis
In this section, we present a performance analysis (in terms of the number of cryptographic operations
of the involved parties and computation costs) of the proposed mobile payment protocol PCMS in order to
demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed protocol over the payment protocols KSL (proposed
by [15]) and LMPP (proposed by [17]) in terms of eﬃciency even using a scenario with communication
restrictions. Table 1 shows the number of cryptographic operations performed by each party of KSL, LMPP
and PCMS during a transaction.
We compare PCMS protocol with KSL and LMPP because they employ symmetric-key operations, the
same way to exchange messages between the entities and similar session key generation technique. Hence,
KSL and LMPP are good recently proposed protocols to demonstrate the eﬃciency of the proposed protocol
PCMS.
Number of
Cryptographic Operations Cryptographic Operations
PCMS KSL LMPP
Symmetric-key C 3 4 5
encryptions/decryptions M 4 5 6PG 3 2 -
Hash Functions C 2 2 2M 1 - 1
PG - - -
Keyed-hash functions
C 2 2 -
M 1 2 -
PG - 1 -
Key generation
C 2 2 -
M 4 1 -
PG 3 1 -
Table 1. Number of cryptographic operations performed by the protocols PCMS, KSL and LMPP at the client (C), merchant (M) and
payment gateway (PG). Note that the dash character (”-”) means zero value.
The notation used in the computation cost analysis is as follows: a) Tsym represents the time required
to execute an encryption/decryption symmetric operation, b) Th represents the time needed to execute a
one-way hash function, and c) Tkh represents the time required to execute a keyed-hash functions (or MAC).
The client needs Tsym + 2Th + 2Tkh to generate a Payment Request whilst the time required by the client
to confirm the payment is 2Tsym. Finally, the total time required by the client to perform a transaction is
4Tsym + 2Th + 2Tkh (including a time Tsym required for the initial information exchange between C and M).
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From the results in Table 1, it can be seen that PCMS requires a lower number of cryptographic opera-
tions for symmetric key encryptions/decryptions than KSL and LMPP. For the keyed-hash functions, PCMS
needs a smaller number of cryptographic operations than KSL but more than LMPP. In the case of Hash
functions, PCMS requires the same number of cryptographic operations as LMPP but one more than KSL.
Despite that in our proposed protocol the key generation process (needed to update keys regularly)
requires more cryptographic operations than KSL and LMPP, this would not cause increased delays because
the key generation processes can be done oﬄine.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed a lightweight protocol for secure on-line payments in a restricted scenario where
direct communication between the client and the merchant is not possible. Our protocol employs symme-
tric cryptographic techniques which has low computation requirements (since no public-key operation is
required) for all engaging parties. Moreover, the Payment Gateway takes an active role in the Payment
process because it acts as a proxy that allows communications between the Client and the Merchant.
Although the proposed protocol was designed for a mobile payment system based on a restricted sce-
nario, the security properties are still preserved (as if we were working in a scenario with full connectivity
among the diﬀerent entities).
Our performance analysis shows that, in general terms, the proposed mobile payment protocol (PCMS)
requires less computation than KSL and LMPP which leads to improved end-to-end performance and could
be deployed on mobile devices with limited computational resources.
References
[1] Z.-Y. Hu, Y.-W. Liu, X. Hu, J.-H. Li, Anonymous micropayments authentication (ama) in mobile data network, in: 23rd Annual
Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (INFOCOM’04), 2004, pp. 46–53.
[2] R.-J. Hwang, S.-H. Shiau, D.-F. Jan, A new mobile payment scheme for roaming services, Electronic Commerce Research and
Applications 6 (2) (2007) 184–191.
[3] R. Martinez-Pelaez, F. J. Rico-Novella, C. Satizabal, Study of mobile payment protocols and its performance evaluation on
mobile devices, International Journal of Information Technology and Management 9 (3) (2010) 337–356.
[4] S. Chari, P. Kermani, S. Smith, L. Tassiulas, Security issues in m-commerce: A usage-based taxonomy, in: E-Commerce Agents,
Marketplace Solutions, Security Issues, and Supply and Demand, 2001, pp. 264–282.
[5] M. Hassinen, K. Hyppo¨nen, K. Haataja, An open, pki-based mobile payment system, in: Emerging Trends in Information and
Communication Security, International Conference (ETRICS’06), 2006, pp. 86–100.
[6] F. Buccafurri, G. Lax, Implementing disposable credit card numbers by mobile phones, Electronic Commerce Research 11 (3)
(2011) 271–296.
[7] N. K. Ratha, J. H. Connell, R. M. Bolle, Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authenticationsystems, IBM Systems
Journal 40 (3) (2001) 614–634.
[8] J. Gao, V. Kulkarni, H. Ranavat, L. Chang, A 2d barcode-based mobile payment system, in: Third International Conference on
Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering (MUE 2009), 2009, pp. 320–329.
[9] O. R. Vincent, O. Folorunso, A. Akinde:, Improving e-payment security using elliptic curve cryptosystem, Electronic Commerce
Research 10 (1) (2010) 27–41.
[10] J. T. Isaac, J. S. Camara, A. I. Manzanares, J. T. Ma´rquez:, Anonymous payment in a kiosk centric model using digital signature
scheme with message recovery and low computational power devices, Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce
Research 1 (2) (2006) 1–11.
[11] J. T. Isaac, J. S. Ca´mara, A secure payment protocol for restricted connectivity scenarios in m-commerce, in: E-Commerce and
Web Technologies, 8th International Conference (EC-Web’07), 2007, pp. 1–10.
[12] J. T. Isaac, S. Zeadally, J. S. Camara, Implementation and performance evaluation of a payment protocol for vehicular ad hoc
networks, Electronic Commerce Research 10 (2) (2010) 209–233.
[13] W. Li, Q. Wen, Q. Su, Zhengping, An eﬃcient and secure mobile payment protocol for restricted connectivity scenarios in
vehicular ad hoc network, Computer Communications 35 (2) (2012) 188–195.
[14] J. L. Abad-peiro, N. Asokan, M. Steiner, M. Waidner, Designing a generic payment service, IBM Systems Journal 37 (1) (1997)
72–88.
[15] S. Kungpisdan, B. Srinivasan, P. D. Le, Lightweight mobile credit-card payment protocol, in: 4th International Conference on
Cryptology in India (Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2003), 2003, pp. 295–308.
[16] N. Asokan, Anonymity in mobile computing environment, in: First Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
(wmcsa 1994), 1994, pp. 200–204.
[17] T. S. Fun, L. Y. Beng, J. Likoh, R. Roslan, A lightweight and private mobile payment protocol by using mobile network operator,
in: International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering, 2008, pp. 162–166.
